Walrasian PMAS

报告摘要：Superadditive market games (SMG) are a class of cooperative games where players are described by their initial endowments and the worths of coalitions are determined by a common superadditive function (referred to as a cooperative function) and the total endowments of the corresponding players. Each SMG could be viewed as an exchange economy and the set of Walrasian equilibrium price vectors, referred to as the Walrasian core, could be used to refine the core. In this paper, we further refine the Walrasian core in several different ways, by investigating a system of price vectors for all related SMGs and requiring some monotonicity property. We study the implication of the idea of PMAS, an important refinement of the core, by showing that cooperative functions that always derive SMGs possessing a PMAS could be characterized by refining the Walrasian cores to single points such that some monotonicity property is satisfied. Several other ways that naturally refine the Walrasian core are also proposed. (joint work with Dong Liang and Ning Yu)

曹志刚，北京交通大学经济管理学院教授。2010年毕业于中科院数学与系统科学研究院并留院任助理研究员。2017年9月加盟北京交通大学经济管理学院，任“卓越百人计划”教授。长期从事合作博弈、交通博弈、网络博弈和算法博弈等方面的研究，在包括Operations Research、Mathematics of Operations Research、Games and Economic Behavior、Journal of Mathematical Economics、Social Choice and Welfare、International Journal of Game Theory和《中国科学：数学》在内的期刊上发表多篇论文。相关成果曾获中国信息经济学理论贡献奖、系统科学与系统工程青年科技奖、中国决策科学青年科技奖和关肇直青年研究奖等荣誉。先后主持国家自然科学基金委的青年、面上和优青项目。兼任中国“双法”研究会智能决策与博弈分会副理事长，中国运筹学会博弈论分会副理事长，中国双法学会青年工作委员会副秘书长、网络科学分会副秘书长，中国信息经济学会常务理事和中国运筹学会理事等职务。